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Rethinking What is Necessary in a Democratic Society: 
Militant Democracy and the Turkish State 
 
Kathleen Cavanaugh* & Edel Hughes** 
 
 
Abstract 
Questions relating to contemporary understandings of democracy continue to preoccupy the 
academic landscape, from politics to law—how does one define democracy; is it necessary to 
recalibrate the concept of democracy to meet the exigencies of the current global security "crisis" 
and, following from this, how does one understand (and control) the democratic relationship of 
representation and accountability between citizen and state? Although those writing on the 
recalibration of democratic theory come from different points of departure, they often arrive at a 
similar conclusion; namely that this global era poses significant challenges to contemporary 
understandings of democracy. This article identifies and focuses on one challenge posed by the 
concept of “militant” democracy against the backdrop of the Turkish case. 
 
There is hardly a better way to avoid discussion than by releasing an 
argument from the control of the present and by saying that only the future 
will reveal its merits.  
Hannah Arendt 
 
I. Introduction 
Questions regarding contemporary understandings of democracy continue to preoccupy the 
academic landscape, from politics to law—how does one define democracy; is it necessary to 
recalibrate the concept of democracy to meet the exigencies of the current global security "crisis" 
and following from this, how does one understand (and control) the democratic relationship of 
representation and accountability between citizen and state? These debates give rise to yet other 
questions that, although not particularly new, have taken on weight in the current global context. 
Are democracy and secularism inextricably linked; in what circumstances can a “democratic” 
state engage lawfully in essentially undemocratic practices and what is the correct balance 
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between security and rights? For lawyers, legal academics, and political scientists, the answers to 
these questions shape how a “democratic” state’s performance is evaluated and push the 
boundaries of what is considered “necessary in a democratic society.” 1  
Although those writing on the recalibration of democratic theory come from different 
points of departure—from those that situate their analysis within the new modes of power that 
have arisen through globalization, to those that focus on the role of law in the securitization of 
the global landscape—they often arrive at a similar conclusion; namely that this global era poses 
significant challenges to contemporary understandings of democracy.2 This article identifies and 
focuses on one challenge posed by the concept of “militant” democracy, defined as a form of 
constitutional democracy authorized to protect civil and political freedom by preemptively 
restricting its exercise. Militant democracy includes a number of techniques engaged to 
(ostensibly) secure democratic perimeters and prevent the so called “Trojan horse” from entering 
the public square. These include the vestment of powers in the executive, the use of emergency 
powers, and the adoption of temporary emergency measures that restrict certain rights, most 
notably expression, political participation, and assembly. For proponents of the militant 
democratic thesis, such measures are necessary because "under cover of fundamental rights and 
the rule of law, the antidemocratic machine could be built up and set in motion legally."3 In 
contrast, those critical of the thesis argue that militant democratic measures do not fit easily 
within an international law framework and their judicial supervision is weak.4 Although militant 
democracy is often embedded in constitutions, and therefore provides a legal framework for 
democracies to “fight back” against movements that look to subvert democratic institutions, such 
"democratic" interventions can also be used to silence political opposition or target particular 
groups. Ultimately, the use of these measures may well erode and devalue the very principles 
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that they seek to protect.  
Since its introduction by Karl Lowenstein in 1937, the concepts associated with militant 
democracy have periodically surfaced within both political science and constitutional theory. 
Although the term itself is not referenced, within both political science and law, there is a 
significant body of work that critically engages with the first two militant democratic techniques: 
the concentration of power in the executive and the use (and abuse) of emergency powers.5 It is 
only within the last two decades that we begin to see specific reference to militant democracy by 
comparative constitutional lawyers, human rights scholars, and political scientists. Within 
comparative constitutional law, militant democratic arguments have bled in to how models of 
liberal democracy are understood.6 Most of the legal scholarship on militant democracy tends to 
focus on the third component—the use of ad hoc (temporary) legislation. The idea that all 
political expression and association is entitled to protection has now shifted towards a reading of 
those measures "necessary in a democratic society," entailing restriction of basic rights in order 
to preserve democracy.7 Here, the extent to which these restrictions are allowed, and therefore 
the cross national variance, is linked to the particulars of each case. The stronger the historical tie 
to democratic governance, the lesser the need for a limit or restriction on rights.8  
The largest body of related work by political scientists has focused on the use of 
executive authority and emergency powers.9 In those studies that look at the use of ad hoc 
measures, the focus has been  on particular cases where militant democratic measures have been 
used to place restrictions, or to excise groups from the public sphere that are considered to be 
“extreme."10 Again, these studies do not make specific reference to the militant democratic 
thesis, but have endeavored to provide causal hypotheses to account for the variation in legal 
techniques employed, as well as the normative frameworks in each case study.11 There are also a 
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number of quantitative studies that examine the underpinnings of state repression, including legal 
techniques used by states engaged in repressive measures.12 Whilst these studies encompass 
more than democratic regimes, the work of Christian Davenport in particular touches upon the 
militant democratic thesis in a number of ways. Davenport examines the role of law in the 
repression dissent nexus and conceptualizes the relationship between a repressive government’s 
behavior and dissent as a two way street. Both sets of actors (government and potential 
dissenters) seek out the most favorable strategies to achieve their goal. Davenport posits five 
indicators, which are assessed by the state when deciding to repress violence or dissent. Amongst 
these are questions related to the feasibility of various policy responses as well as the state’s 
ability to carry out and enforce the reactive policy. While the evaluation of these measures will 
likely take place, as Davenport argues, against the backdrop of the other indicators, the nature 
and degree of the threat, and the political economy of the state, the repressive tools of the state 
(particularly liberal, democratic states) both in kind and degree, are defined by the norms of that 
society and are reflected (indeed find determinacy) in the law.13 Finally, there is a significant 
body of work that examines the inclusion-moderation/exclusion-radicalization hypothesis.14 
These hypotheses provide an important foil to the militant democracy argument and raises a 
number of questions regarding the process of democratization, the way we engage with Islam 
and democracy (in many cases seeing these as fixed and beyond interrogation) and importantly, 
how exactly we assess the moderating effect on processes of inclusion or the radicalizing effect 
of exclusion.  
There are a few conclusions that can be drawn from each of these areas of work. First, 
that the militant democratic thesis is now deeply embedded in our contemporary understanding 
of democracy. Second, that important research on various components of the militant democracy 
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thesis has been undertaken within both political science and in law (constitutional, international 
human rights) yet these threads are often disconnected, remaining in their disciplinary pockets. 
Finally, despite the various bodies of work that examine and indeed challenge the militant 
democratic thesis, there remain significant legal and empirical gaps in the literature. This article 
will endeavor to fill one such gap by focusing on one of the most visible militant democratic 
technique—the exclusion of political parties—specifically looking at the Turkish case.  
Although, the principles that underpin militant democracy are embedded in a number of 
constitutions globally and have served as a legal technique to excise groups from the public 
sphere in a number of so called “democratic” states, this article is situating an examination in 
Turkey where militant democracy has been "co-determinate of the Turkish political paradigm."15 
Our choice to focus on the Turkish case is underpinned by two main factors. Historically, both 
militant democratic reasoning coupled with an enforced secularism which embedded a particular 
reading of Turkish national identity underpinned the rulings of the Turkish Constitutional Court 
and was reproduced by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decision in the case of 
Refah Partsi v Turkey (2003).16 This ruling was significant in that it gave the concept of militant 
democracy "legal legs" at a supranational level and, as Patrick Macklem argued, "[b]y its 
decision, the principle of militant democracy has become an explicit feature of European law."17  
The Court’s reasoning in this decision was largely based on the belief that the Refah 
Party was proffering an "unacceptable form of legal pluralism . . . that appears to have had its 
origins in a system established in the early years of Islam where Jewish and polytheist 
communities possessed a modicum of self-government independent of Islamic law."18 The 
Court’s decision in upholding the ban on Refah was informed by its belief that an Islamist 
political party, however moderate or reformist, was per se incompatible with a democratic 
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society, as Islam, according to the Court, is a belief system that is intolerant, rigid, and one that 
cannot be divorced from the political sphere.19 This view mirrors the perceptions held by 
member states of the Council of Europe that increasingly have come to see Islam in the public 
sphere as in contradistinction to democratic tradition. More broadly, however, this debate about 
the secular identity of democracy maps onto a larger discussion about the moderating effects of 
democratic political participation of so called “Islamist” groups. As Mehmet Gurses has 
observed, 
The rise of Islamist movements in the Muslim world has been the subject of 
heated debate among scholars and policymakers. One group of scholars argues 
that Islamists use elections as a facade and warn against their political ascendency 
via electoral democracy. Another group of scholars, however, points to the 
moderating effects democracy has on views held by Islamists.20  
How much the Turkish case can inform a broad discussion about Islamism and 
democracy is unclear. There is much about the Turkish historical and political landscape that sets 
it apart from its neighbors. Although electoral processes were historically “managed” by the 
military, something that is shared with other states in the region, the election of the Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi or AK Party21 (and the fact it has remained in power through the electoral 
process) sets it apart from most other Muslim majority states. The AK Party is both an 
opposition party historically excised from political power as well as an “Islamist” party, a type of 
"civil" Islamism that has accessed and maintained power through electoral processes for over a 
decade. These factors all give weight to the argument that the Turkish case is unique. That said, 
the AK Party did push forward processes of democratization however incomplete and has sought 
to construct a more pluralist Turkish national identity, which cracks open the question: what 
ought to be the limits of democratic self preservation?  
This leads us to a second factor in selecting the Turkish case. The change in Turkey’s 
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political landscape in 2002, which brought the AK Party to power, provides us with an 
opportunity to test one particular technique which is central to the militant democratic project—
the use of ad hoc measures which restrict or excise political parties from the public domain. The 
leadership of the AK Party emerged “from the cadres of the first organized political 
representative of Islamism in Turkish politics,”22 some of whom had previously been excluded 
from the Turkish political landscape as a result of militant democratic arguments. So, what can 
be assessed in the thirteen years since the Refah party decision in Turkey? Has the Trojan horse 
indeed entered the Turkish political landscape or is it possible to argue for "faith in 
moderation?”23  
In addressing these questions, this article will be divided into four main sections: the first 
section will provide a brief historical overview of the concept of militant democracy, 
reconstructing the attendant debates and developments. As the banning of political parties in 
Turkey has occurred at a frequency that sets it apart from other Council of Europe member 
states, section two will examine the political context within which this has occurred and provide 
a legal audit of cases where the militant democratic thesis has been engaged to justify such 
exclusions in Turkey. Section three will then turn to dissolution of political parties at the 
European level, focusing on Turkey and the case law of the ECtHR. The final section will ask 
whether the AK Party marks the beginning of post [il]liberal secular Turkey. In undertaking 
these tasks, the multiple disciplinary lenses that prop up militant democracy theory will be drawn 
from. 
II. Militant Democracy 
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Karl Lowenstein first introduced the concept of militant democracy in 1937.24 As we noted 
earlier, the arguments that underpin the concept are rooted in the "toe in the door" thesis, that 
posits that if antidemocratic groups are allowed to exploit the features of democracy such as 
freedom of speech, press and assembly, as well as political participation, the path remains open 
for them to seize power and destroy the institutions that provided their platform. Therefore, 
Loewenstein argued, democracy "must become militant."25  
Loewenstein rejected the constraints implied by what Alexander S. Kirshner refers to as 
the "paradox" of militant democracy: "the possibility that efforts to stem challenges to self-
government might themselves lead to the degradation of democratic politics or the fall of a 
representative regime."26 For Loewenstein, and more contemporaneously, András Sajó, a former 
ECtHR judge,  
it is hard to avoid a departure from “constitutionalism as usual” in the fight 
against international terrorism; and (2) it is better to constitutionally authorize 
such a departure by setting levels of departure, where the greater the departure, 
the stronger the judicial or other control by external bodies; however, such control 
might be exercised ex post under the constitution. The example of militant 
democracy indicates that a clearly constitutionalized regime of exceptions makes 
the constitutional system sustainable.27  
Loewenstein’s writings in the 1930s and 1940s were in response to the rise of fascism in Europe. 
This backdrop would also inform the enactment of militant democratic measures in a number of 
European countries that adopted militant democratic measures following World War II. For 
example, under Article 9(2) of the German Basic Law, "[a]ssociations whose aims or activities 
contravene the criminal laws, or that are directed against the constitutional order or the concept 
of international understanding, shall be prohibited."28 Article 18 warns that whoever abuses 
freedom of expression, assembly, or association, among others, "in order to combat the free 
democratic basic order shall forfeit these basic rights."29 Article 21(1) stipulates that political 
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parties, "must conform to democratic principles," and in paragraph two, it outlines that "[p]arties 
that, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the 
free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany 
shall be unconstitutional."30 Similarly, Article 6 of the Constitution of Spain states: 
Political parties are the expression of political pluralism, they contribute to the 
formation and expression of the will of the people and are an essential instrument 
for political participation. Their creation and the exercise of their activities are 
free in so far as they respect the Constitution and the law. Their internal structure 
and their functioning must be democratic.31  
Given the historical experience of both Germany and Spain, it is unsurprising that there 
would be a constitutionally embedded guarantee protecting the "democratic" nature of the state, 
what perhaps is surprising is how pervasive such guarantees are throughout Europe. Most post 
war European states have, either through their constitutions or legislative framework, sought to 
restrict the rights of those "opposed to the constitutional order."32  
Looking specifically at the Turkish case, the militant democratic thesis has framed the 
justification for the various undertakings by previous Turkish governments in which, primarily, 
Islamic groups were excised from the public political sphere. Before the AK Party assumed 
power in Turkey in 2002, secularism was enforced as a matter of “right." Historically, this 
concept of a secular society meant the absence of religious involvement in government affairs as 
well as the absence of government involvement in religious affairs. During the early Republican 
period, Kemalists founded the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). Given the ethos of this 
period, establishing a state authority to deal with matters of religion seems counterintuitive. 
However, Republicans quickly became aware that their initial agenda, to eliminate religion from 
the public sphere and distinguish between religion and Turkish culture/tradition, would not 
succeed as religion and culture within Turkish civil society were inextricably linked. Their 
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solution was to establish an official state bureau to deal with religious affairs, which would 
reproduce, and control, a particular understanding of Islam. Religious practice was, according to 
Presidency rules, protected in the private sphere, but the public sphere was to be policed; any 
manifestations of conservative or “Islamic” lifestyles in public was considered to be a 
“politicization” of Islam and a threat to democracy.33  
Secularism would evolve as an ideology or belief that is an end in itself, something that 
requires protection and indeed enforcement. Although such a reading is not unique to Turkey, 
and can be found littered throughout state rhetoric (particularly in Europe) it has been 
foundational in the Turkish case. This form of illiberal secularism, as José Casanova has quite 
rightly termed it, polices religion, confining it to the realm of the private and communal sphere, 
thereby keeping the public square free from religious manifestations.34 The Turkish state 
engaged the constitution and the Constitutional Court in regulating democratic self-defense and 
through its domestic jurisprudence gave legitimacy to preventative state measures that enforced 
secularism, actions that would later be supported at the international level in the Refah case. 
The election of the AK Party, an ostensibly moderate “religious” party, was met with 
significant apprehension amongst Turkish nationalists who feared that this was the toe in the 
door and that faith, even in moderation, was incompatible with the democratic foundations of the 
state. There have been a number of studies, which have attempted to provide some empirical and 
analytical clarity as to whether the entry of the AK Party into the mainframe of Turkey’s political 
terrain has unleashed an antidemocratic machine, or conversely, led to a process of moderation 
through the necessities and responsibilities of governance (an idea that underpins the inclusion 
moderation hypothesis). Two in particular, Berna Turam’s study of Islam and democracy in 
Turkey35 and Gurses’ examination of the inclusion moderation hypothesis using quantitative and 
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qualitative data on Turkey,36 merit some review. 
Turam’s study examines interactions between Turkey’s “mainstream” Islamists and the 
state. Here, rather than examining the inclusion of these actors in electoral politics or parties in 
Turkey, she focuses instead on "the contemporary everyday settings that have allowed Islamic 
actors and the state to interact and reshape each other."37 In doing so, she challenges the 
exclusion/radicalization hypothesis by suggesting that exclusion may in the Turkish context have 
actually led to moderation, which if correct, would lend weight to militant democratic arguments. 
Despite some very rich analysis, however, it can be argued that Turam’s work does not 
adequately capture the rather more complex relationship between state and Islam in Turkey. In 
focusing on the Gülen movement,38 a transnational Muslim community movement, Turam 
appears to map their particular lens on to Turkey's political and social landscape. Although it is 
true that until 2012, the AK Party and the Gülen movement were a coalition of sorts, promoting 
moderate “Islamist politics," nonetheless, they were quite distinct entities. Whereas Gülen 
members were elitists, comprised of a group of “organic” intellectuals representing a portion of 
Islamic habitus with their own perspectives on Islam, the Refah and AK Parties were populists. 
As well, these parties, especially true for the AK Party, were not driven by ideology and much 
like in other Muslim societies their actions have "little to do with religion as such; they are more 
closely tied to the material and nonmaterial interests of those who hold power."39  
It is true, as Turam argues, that especially in the 1990s, members of the Gülen movement 
were excluded from the public domain and that military and legal interventions excluded certain 
political parties from holding power.40 However, the identity politics represented by religious 
affiliations were not completely banned or excluded from the public sphere in Turkey.41 In 
emphasizing the ways in which members of the Gülen movement were excluded from the public 
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sphere, Turam fails to recognize the social conditions that explain why, for example, the Gülen 
movement failed to mobilize the masses against AK Party in the local elections of March and 
Presidential elections of August 2014. Both of these points are important in order to tackle the 
“moderating” effect of exclusion. 
Gurses’ study provides an interesting foil to Turam’s analysis. Here Gurses asks "the 
important question of whether Islamist groups [in Turkey] are actually transformed by 
democratic inclusion."42 He attempts to "test" the inclusion moderation theory by examining 
survey data on Turkey collected by the World Values Survey in 2000 and 2007, alongside in-
depth interviews he undertook with members of Turkey’s Islamist parties and communities. In 
order to extrapolate to what "extent Islamists have moderated their views as a function of 
participation/inclusion,"43 Gurses specifically focuses on two factors: the acceptance of political 
pluralism (ideological moderation) and participation in electoral processes (behavioral 
moderation). Gurses’ conclusion is that "Islamists develop positive attitudes toward electoral 
democracy to the extent that they are allowed to share power. Islamists’ support for democracy, 
however, seems to be fragmented, provisional and driven by pragmatism more than a principled 
commitment to democratic norms and values."44  
There are a number of unresolved questions that arise from Gurses’ work, some of which 
he acknowledges in his conclusion. Much like other large N quantitative studies, there are 
limitations as to what can be derived both in terms of relationships between Islamists and the 
state and shifts in attitudes of Islamic parties toward democracy without partnering the results 
with other rich qualitative work. As well, as other studies indicate, even if it is possible to argue 
that Islamist groups in Turkey moderate through the political process, this may not mean that 
democracy is secured as, "the harbinger of democratization and/or consolidation of democracy" 
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may not rest solely with "participation of the Islamist groups/parties in the electoral system."45 
Finally, as noted earlier, the Turkish case may not reproduce easily and may have "qualitative 
differences from the typical Muslim-majority States."46 That said, in each study, the fact that 
political actors or parties were labeled as “Islamists” framed the analyses that followed and was 
the entry point in to the discussion on Turkey’s path to democratization.  
In addition, and importantly, whether including the AK Party in mainstream politics 
brings about a modification or moderation of behavior may be secondary to whether, by their 
actions, the AK Party has opened up a political space that will be hard for them to close. It will 
be argued that the inclusion of the AK Party has cracked open spaces where pluralism and 
dissent have manifested. This exposes and makes vulnerable the theoretical underpinnings of 
militant democracy that made possible the exclusion of Islamist (and indeed Kurdish) political 
party participation in the past. The AK Party’s earlier engagement with the now stalled Kurdish 
peace process has broadened the political space for Kurdish parties to operate. These parties in 
the past were, much like Islamist groups, frequently banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court. 
As well, the pro Kurdish Halkların Demokratik Partisi: People’s Democratic Party (HDP)47 
formed in the wake of the AK Party reforms, may yet prove to be AK Party’s main opposition. 
As this political space broadens, fragmenting and perhaps reframing identity politics in Turkey 
may provide a vehicle for broader democratization.  
III. The Banning of Political Parties in Turkey  
The legal restrictions on the activities of political parties in Turkey are found in the Turkish 
Constitution and in Law No. 2820 on Political Parties.48 Article 68 of the Turkish Constitution 
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recognizes that political parties are “indispensable elements of democratic political life” but 
notes in Art. 68(4) that the: 
[S]tatutes and programs, as well as the activities of political parties shall not be 
contrary to the independence of the State, its indivisible integrity with its territory 
and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of 
the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular republic; they shall not 
aim to promote or establish class or group dictatorship or dictatorship of any kind, 
nor shall they incite citizens to crime.49 
In the Turkish context the proviso that activities of political parties shall not be contrary 
to the indivisibility of the state or the principles of a democratic and secular republic, takes on 
particular relevance, as detailed below. Article 69 of the Turkish Constitution provides that 
"activities, internal regulations and operation of political parties shall be in line with democratic 
principles" and sanctions the permanent dissolution of a political party where it violates the 
provisions of Article 68(4) "when the Constitutional Court determines that the party in question 
has become a centre for the execution of such activities."50 An amendment to this article of the 
Constitution in 2001 slightly raised the threshold of what would be deemed as unconstitutional 
activities meriting dissolution and introduced the consideration that a political party would be 
deemed to become the center of such actions "only when such actions are carried out intensively 
by the members."51 Equally significant was the "new gradual punishment system"52 introduced 
by the 2001 amendments to the constitution, which provided that political parties could have 
their state funding removed as a less restrictive alternative to being closed, meaning as Gönenç 
notes, that instead of dissolving the political party permanently, the Constitutional Court may 
rule that the party should be precluded from receiving  state aid, either wholly or in part, 
depending on the intensity of the actions brought before the court.53 Additionally, Article 149 
was amended to stipulate a three-fifths majority of the Constitutional Court was required in 
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political party closure cases, subsequently increased to a two-thirds majority in the amendments 
introduced by the constitutional reforms of 2010.54  
In addition to these relevant constitutional provisions, Law No. 2820 on the Regulation of 
Political Parties (1983) establishes a comprehensive regulatory framework for the establishment, 
membership, conduct, and financing of political parties in Turkey.55 Specific to this article, the 
most pertinent sections of the law are sections 78, 80, 81, 90, 95, and 101.56 What is clear from 
these provisions is that for political parties in Turkey, quite stringent conditions are attached to 
how they conduct their activities in the public domain. Where such conduct pierces what is read 
as Turkey’s secular, unitary framework, then both the state and, since 1961, the Constitutional 
Court, are likely to intervene. 
A. The Banning of Political Parties: Guarding or Subverting Democracy? 
Since the foundation of the Republic in 1923, a total of forty-seven political parties have been 
banned in Turkey, the largest number of any country in comparative European terms.57 The 
majority of the bans were instituted in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, when eighteen 
political parties were banned.58 In the remaining cases, fourteen political parties were proscribed 
based on their support real or perceived for separatism, eight for procedural irregularities, five 
for engaging in antisecular activities, one for being the successor of a banned party, and one, the 
Progressive Republican Party which was the first party to be banned in Turkey, for "treasonous 
activities."59 In 2008, the ruling AK Party came very close to being banned by the Constitutional 
Court60 on the basis that it had engaged in activities contrary to the principles of secularism. 
Since it was established in 1961, forty-five cases have come before the Turkish Constitutional 
16 
Court and in twenty-seven of these the Court has approved the closure of the political party.61 
Subsequently, many of these closure decisions have been challenged before the ECtHR. The 
most recent case was in 2009, where the domestic Court upheld the ban on the Demokratik 
Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party) on the basis that they advocated separatism.62 
When reviewing the jurisprudence of the Turkish Constitutional Court, the decisions to 
ban political parties in Turkey tend to be either procedurally or politically justified.63 The 
procedural requirements for political parties in Turkey remain the most stringent amongst 
Council of Europe countries. Under these regulations, a party must reach a 10 percent threshold 
in order to take a place in Parliament, a threshold that is the highest in Europe64 but which has 
been maintained on the basis that it provides stability, whereas coalition governments have 
threatened stability in Turkey in the past.65  
Amongst the political reasons for the closure of parties, two central themes emerge: 
closures on the basis of anti secular activities and dissolution on the basis that a party has 
advocated separatism, which corresponds broadly to the conservative religious right and the 
socialist, frequently Kurdish, left. For scholars of Turkish constitutional history that these are the 
two reasons most often invoked is unsurprising. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s radical program of 
secularization was implemented from the foundation of the Republic and included the abolition 
of the Sultanate and Caliphate, the closure of all madreses and kuttabs (religious schools) and 
abolition of religious orders, the replacement of Islamic law with European style legal codes, the 
substitution of Latin letters for Arabic script and, most importantly, the complete secularization 
of the Constitution.66  
As a result of these measures, tensions emerged between secular and non secular parts of 
Turkish civil society. Nonetheless, Atatürk sought to emulate what he viewed as more 
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progressive “Western” states, and expression of religious sentiment in the public sphere fell 
victim to his laic reformist zeal, incorporated into Turkish law under Article 163 of the 1926 
Penal Code, which prohibited propaganda against the principles of secularism and outlawed 
religious functionaries from criticizing the laws and public authorities during the course of their 
work.67 In 1939, the Law of Associations further cemented secularism by prohibiting the 
formation of religious societies and making it illegal for political parties to engage in religious 
activities or in the making of religious propaganda.68 A new Civil Code, which was adapted from 
the Civil Code of Switzerland, was passed before the National Assembly on 17 February 1926 
and repealed the religious Şeriat Courts declaring its rules null and void.69 The Civil Code also 
governed issues such as commerce, maritime law, criminal law, civil and criminal procedure and 
created a new judiciary to administer the new laws but, importantly, excluded all provisions of 
the previous religious and customary legal systems.  
Atatürk’s efforts set the scene for what can be viewed as an illiberal and overly restrictive 
form of secularism, confining religious sentiment rigidly to the private sphere as embodied under 
Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution. Article 2 guarantees the secular nature of the state by 
providing that the Republic of Turkey is a "democratic, secular and social State governed by the 
rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; 
respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets 
set forth in the Preamble."70 The Preamble to the Constitution, which Article 2 incorporates, 
asserts the secular democratic nature of the state by affirming that: 
 [N]o protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national 
interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its state 
and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, principles, 
reforms and modernism of Atatürk and that, as required by the principle of 
secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever by sacred religious feelings 
in state affairs and politics.71  
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The constitutional guarantee of secularism, quite unusual in the context of a majority Muslim 
state,72 and the particularly militant form of laicism, espoused in the Turkish context, has meant 
that the manifestations of religion have been, at least until the election of the AK Party in 2002, 
excised from the public sphere.73  
Those political parties that were banned for political reasons mainly those who are 
deemed to advocate separatism fell foul of a second pillar of Atatürk’s Republic. Expressing an 
identity that was something other than Turkish clashed with the restrictive attitude to the 
recognition of minorities and the paranoia regarding separatism. As Hugh Pope has rightly 
identified, "[i]n Turkey, almost nothing in the lexicon of international politics provokes a more 
prickly reaction than the simple word 'minority.'”74 The notion of ethnic and religious 
community divisions “conjures up two threatening images for the majority of Turks: one of 
Christian powers plotting to divide, rule, and carve up the country, as happened after the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire, the other of non-Muslim fifth columnists conspiring to stab the Turkish 
majority in the back.”75 The Preamble to the Constitution76 which refers to Atatürk, the founder 
of the Republic as an "immortal leader" and an "unrivalled hero" recognizes "Turkish historical 
and moral values or the nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Atatürk [with] all 
Turkish citizens . . . united in national honour and pride, in national joy and grief, in their rights 
and duties regarding national existence, in blessings and in burdens."77 
In contemporary Turkey, Atatürk’s legacy hangs heavy, imprinted in both the institutions 
of the state but, equally, in the struggle for Turkish identity. The "children of the republic" have 
been tasked with securing that legacy and, at a very basic level, attempts to do so are manifested 
in the seemingly omnipresent Atatürk imagery. As Esra Özyürek has noted, 
[v]isitors to Turkey are immediately greeted with images and reminders of 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. When travellers land at the Atatürk Airport in Istanbul, 
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two gigantic pictures of the leader welcome them. The shuttle from the airport 
drops them in Taksim Square, across from the Atatürk library and the monument 
to the struggle for independence led by Atatürk. When they tour the city, visitors 
pass by the Atatürk Bridge, only then to encounter the numerous statues, portraits, 
and sayings of the leader than encumber every available public space.78  
Kemalism and the values of Atatürk’s republic are not just reflected in the ubiquitous 
Atatürk iconography. The education system, for example, as well as the school curriculum has 
been seen as a key means of propagating a single notion of culture, language, ethnic identity, and 
religion. Compulsory courses in primary and secondary schools "transmit the official Kemalist 
version of Turkish history and various topics such as Turkey’s relations with her neighbours, all 
in a highly nationalist and militarist language."79 Those who seek to challenge this dominant 
narrative, including political parties, run the risk of attracting the ire of state institutions.  
B. Dissolution of Political Parties and the European Framework 
Although international human rights mechanisms have not yet fully embraced pre-emptive 
measures when dealing with the dissolution of political parties, a number of decisions by the 
ECtHR80 have been underpinned by militant democratic arguments. The 1998 case of United 
Communist Party v. Turkey (1998) was the first case where the dissolution of a political party, 
based on militant democratic arguments, was brought before the ECtHR.81 Since then, the Court 
has dealt with twelve cases that directly concern the dissolution of political parties. In nine of 
these twelve cases the Court ruled that the dissolution was a violation of the Convention. 
However, in two cases, Refah Partisi v. Turkey (2003)82 and Batasuna v. Spain (2009), the Court 
found that the dissolution was within the margin afforded to the state and not beyond that which 
was "necessary in a democratic society."83  
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Specific to Turkey, the policing of the public square at the domestic level was paired at 
the international level, as many of the political parties that were banned lodged a complaint 
under Article 11 of the ECtHR, which provides for the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
to freedom of association.84 Article 11 allows a state to limit the right provided that such 
restrictions are prescribed by law and "are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."85  
While the ECtHR found a violation of Article 11 in a majority of cases where parties 
were dissolved in Turkey, in Refah the Court upheld the Turkish Constitutional Court’s decision 
to ban the party.86 The Refah judgment has already generated much academic discussion and 
critique and the concepts of militant democracy and legal pluralism weigh heavily in the Court’s 
reasoning in this case.87 The case illuminates the "intimate relationship"88 between militant 
democracy and legal pluralism which, for this article’s purpose, will be defined as religious, 
cultural or national communities that seek to implement a form of autonomy not authorized by 
the constitution of the state within which it resides. This article will, therefore, briefly revisit 
some of the most relevant terrain raised by this case.  
The Refah Party was founded in July 1983 by the former Prime Minister of Turkey, 
Necmettin Erbakan.89 In the local elections of March 1989 the party obtained about 10% of the 
vote and its candidates were elected mayors of a number of towns and five large cities.90 
Between 1989 and 1995 the party grew immensely in power, partly, as Susanna Dokupil 
suggests, "because of the Islamic resurgence in the country, partly because of divisions among 
the center-right parties, and partly in response to anti-Western sentiment."91 Against this 
backdrop, in the general elections of 1995, Refah won twenty-four mayoral seats and a total of 
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158 seats in the Assembly. Perhaps worryingly for the secularist establishment, Refah was 
becoming a political force. Having gained approximately 22 percent of the vote, it held the 
largest number of seats in the Turkish Parliament.92 
In June 1996, Refah formed a coalition with the Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party). The 
True Path Party was avowedly secular, pro Western and anti Refah.93 From the outset, therefore, 
the coalition was an odd coupling. What is interesting to note, however, is that in an interview 
given shortly after the coalition was formed, the True Path Party leader, Tansu Çiller, stated that 
although she was still in favor of the principle of secularism and remained cautious about Refah, 
"she believed that taking the Refah party into the mainstream of Turkish politics was the only 
way to maintain social peace and preserve democracy."94 
In May 1997 the Principal State Counsel at the Court of Cassation applied to the 
Constitutional Court of Turkey to have Refah dissolved on the basis that it was a "centre of 
activities contrary to the principles of secularism."95 In support of this assertion, it was alleged 
that the Refah chairman and other prominent members had advocated the wearing of the Islamic 
headscarf in state schools and buildings, thus violating the principle of secularism; that Erbakan 
had encouraged Muslims to join Refah by stating that only his party could establish the 
supremacy of the Koran and that Erbakan had assured Islamist movements of his support.96 It 
was also alleged that members of Refah had called for the secular political system to be replaced 
by a theocratic system and that members had expressed support for introduction of Shari’a law in 
Turkey.97  
In their submission, the defendants rejected the claim that Refah represented a threat to 
the secular nature of the Turkish Republic and alleged that extracts from Erbakan’s speeches had 
been taken out of context and distorted.98 The applicants also argued that statements which had 
22 
advanced political Islam99 had been made by members who were not authorized to represent 
Refah and that when the party was made aware of their actions, the three members of Parliament 
concerned were expelled from the party.100 Despite these arguments, in January 1998, the 
Turkish Constitutional Court dissolved the party on the basis that it had become a center of 
activities contrary to the principle of secularism, basing its decision on Sections 101(b) and 
103(1) of Law No. 2820 on the Regulation of Political Parties.101 
In their submission to the ECtHR, the applicants alleged that the dissolution of Refah and 
the order preventing its leaders, including Necmettin Erbakan, Şevket Kazan, and Ahmet Tekdal 
from holding similar office in any other political party had infringed their right to freedom of 
association, established in Article 11 of the ECHR.102 In its earlier jurisprudence, also involving 
a Turkish political party, the Court had stressed the importance of the rights arising from Article 
11: 
[A]n association, including a political party, is not excluded from the protection 
afforded by the Convention simply because its activities are regarded by the 
national authorities as undermining the constitutional structures of the State and 
calling for the imposition of restrictions. As the Court has said in the past, while it 
is in principle open to the national authorities to take such action as they consider 
necessary to respect the rule of law or to give effect to constitutional rights, they 
must do so in a manner which is compatible with their obligations under the 
Convention and subject to review by the Convention institutions.103  
The Court had also stated that the restrictions on Article 11, provided for in paragraph two of the 
provision, should be strictly construed where political parties are concerned; "only convincing 
and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on such parties’ freedom of association."104 It is 
unsurprising therefore that in four cases concerning dissolution of political parties prior to the 
Refah case, the European Court found violations of Article 11.105 In assessing the role of the 
Court in cases concerning the dissolution of political parties, Olgun Akbulut suggests that the 
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Court tends to protect those parties that have been sanctioned for their criticism of state policy on 
sensitive domestic issues but is unlikely to protect parties who espouse anti secular viewpoints 
(like Refah) or those with links to “terrorist” organizations.106  
In its examination of the Refah case, the Court first assessed whether there was an 
interference with the rights of Refah Partisi under Article 11 of the Convention and concluded 
that there was, in fact, an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of association.107 The 
Court then looked at whether this interference could be justified by looking in turn at whether it 
was "prescribed by law," whether it served a "legitimate aim" and whether the interference was 
"necessary in a democratic society."108 In its assessment of the first element whether the 
interference was prescribed by law the Court noted that Article 69 of the Turkish Constitution 
gave the Constitutional Court sole discretion in the issue of dissolution of political parties and 
the measures imposed by the Constitutional Court were based on sections 101 and 107 of Law 
2820, as well as Articles 68, 69 and 84 of the Constitution of Turkey.109 The provisions in 
question were accessible to the applicants and given the status of Refah as a large political party 
with legal advisors familiar with constitutional law and the rules applicable to political parties, 
the applicants were reasonably able to foresee that they ran the risk of dissolution of the party if 
they or the party’s members engaged in anti secular activities.110  
As to whether the interference served a legitimate aim, the Turkish government asserted 
that it pursued several, namely the protection of public safety, national security, the rights and 
freedoms of others and the prevention of crime.111 The applicants argued, however, that the real 
reason for Refah’s dissolution was that its economic policy, which included reducing the national 
debt to zero, would threaten the interests of major businesses and the military.112 With a "notably 
brief analysis"113 the European Court concluded that the applicants had not presented sufficient 
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evidence to suggest that Refah had been dissolved for reasons other than those cited by the 
Constitutional Court and having taken into account "the importance of the principle of 
secularism for the democratic system in Turkey" agreed with the position advanced by the 
government and concluded that Refah’s dissolution pursued several of the legitimate aims listed 
in Article 11.114  
Finally, with regard to whether the interference was "necessary in a democratic society," 
the applicants argued that the speeches advancing political Islam had been made several years 
prior to the institution of dissolution proceedings and therefore Refah could not be said to 
constitute a threat to secularism and democracy in Turkey at the time of the proceedings.115 In its 
thirteen year existence it had taken on many responsibilities of local and central government and 
accordingly in coming to its decision, the Court should assess all of the factors that had led to the 
decision to dissolve the party and all of the party’s activities since it had come into existence.116 
The applicants also pointed to the fact that during the year in which it was in power (from June 
1996 to July 1997), it made no attempt to introduce legislation that would facilitate a regime 
based on Islamic law.117 Furthermore, Refah had expelled the members who had made the 
inflammatory statements and Erbakan’s comments, when read in context, contained no apologia 
for violence, nor did Refah’s constitution or program make any reference to either Shari’a or 
Islam.118 The applicants argued that to sanction the dissolution of Refah, the imposition of 
restrictions on the political activities of its members, and the financial losses the party would 
suffer as a result would constitute an interference which was disproportionate to the legitimate 
aims pursued.119  
The Turkish government put forth a militant democratic argument suggesting that had 
Refah been the sole party in power in the government, it "would have been quite capable of 
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implementing its policy and thus putting an end to democracy."120 A number of other arguments 
were also advanced, including the assertion that certain aspects of the party’s activities and 
speeches suggested that if the party held power, it would introduce “a plurality of legal systems” 
and “had adopted an ambiguous stance with regard to the use of force to gain power and retain 
it.”121 In this regard, the government alleged that some members of Refah advocated the use of 
violence in order to resist certain government policies or to gain power, constituting incitement 
to a popular uprising.122  
The European Court’s approach to this case departed from its reasoning from earlier 
judgments in a number of significant respects. First, the Court failed to use Refah’s constitution 
to determine if there was a specific exception to Article 11(1). The Constitution of Refah made 
no reference to either Shari’a or Islamic law forming the basis of the Turkish system. Even if the 
proposals of Refah were inconsistent with the principle of secularism set out in the Turkish 
Constitution, as David Schilling has noted, instead of ensuring the freedom to associate and 
publicly debate ideas, as provided for in Article 11, the European Court became "the judge of 
secularism."123 Second, it did not assess the political behavior of Refah when it was the 
controlling party in government.124 Third, it placed too great an emphasis on the more extreme 
members within Refah. It is important to understand the Court’s reading of these points against 
the political landscape in Turkey at the time. The media in Turkey was a particularly useful 
vehicle in promoting Refah as anti democratic. One effective technique was to graft the imagery 
of religious fundamentalism (so, for example, public figures who were calling for Shari’a) to the 
Refah party. This, in turn, helped to facilitate and justify actions to dissolve the party using 
militant democratic arguments.  
In its consideration of the case, the Court revisited its ruling in the United Communist 
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Party of Turkey v. Turkey by emphasizing that democracy is an important feature of the 
European public order and that freedom of thought, conscience and religion, protected by Article 
9 of the Convention, is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of 
the Convention.125 Nonetheless, the Court then turned to the principle of secularism, which it 
argued was “one of the fundamental principles of the state which are in harmony with the rule of 
law and respect for human rights and democracy.”126 The dissolution of the Refah Partsi, was, 
then, within the power of preventive intervention on the part of the state because “a State may 
reasonably forestall the execution of such a policy, which is incompatible with the Convention’s 
provisions, before an attempt is made to implement it through concrete steps that might prejudice 
civil peace and the country’s democratic regime."127 Dissolving Refah, the Court argued was a 
preventative measure necessary to meet the pressing social need of averting the danger to 
democracy and was a proportionate response to the legitimate aim of upholding democracy and 
the principles of secularism.128 The ECtHR followed the “logic of collapsing unity, democracy 
and progress” employed by the Turkish Constitutional Court, which had indicated that Refah was 
a “political representation of the general Islamist threat:”129  
The root of the Islamist threat was in its being backward-looking, threatening to 
steer Turkey away from the road of progress. According to the Court, the major 
threat Refah represented was to the laicism principle of the constitution. At the 
hands of the Court, laicism became not merely the tenet of separation of religious 
and governmental spheres, or even of state control over religion, but also a crucial 
embodiment of the idea of progress. In turn, laicism functioned as a means of 
enhancing national unity.130  
The approach of the ECtHR in Refah was the precursor to how the Court has related questions of 
religion and, in particular, Islam, in the public sphere. That the Court may continue to adopt an 
inflexible approach to this issue was left in little doubt by its view of Islamic formulations of law 
as that which, 
27 
clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal 
law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way it 
intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious 
precepts[. . .] In the Court’s view, a political party whose actions seem to be 
aimed at introducing sharia in a State party to the Convention can hardly be 
regarded as an association complying with the democratic ideal that underlies the 
whole of the Convention.131  
Leaving aside the Court’s limited understanding and questionable reading of Shari’a,132 the 
Courts reasoning was problematic in two other significant ways. First, contrary to the arguments 
of the state, Refah’s Constitution made no reference to imposing Shari’a law in Turkey. Second, 
the Court’s decision did not reflect the Venice Commission’s guidelines on the prohibition of 
political parties, in particular the essential notion that dissolution of political parties should be a 
last resort only in circumstances where that party advocates violent methods.133  
IV. Post [Il]Liberal Secular Turkey? 
In the fifteen years since the Refah judgment, Turkey’s socio political landscape has been 
transformed. While the degree to which these changes constitute true reform is debated, there is 
no doubt that Turkey’s social, economic and to a more limited extent, legal framework has 
undergone significant change. Yet the fundamental tensions134 that were expressed in Refah 
between what is necessary to protect democracy (militant democracy) and what is necessary in a 
democracy (legal pluralism), persist. Militant democratic, illiberal secular tendencies remain 
structurally embedded in Turkey’s institutions, despite Turkey entering what has been termed a 
“post secular” era.  
It is here where one returns to the question of what is necessary in a democratic society 
and the paradox of self-determination; "the capacity of a collectivity to freely determine its 
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political status and pursue its economic, social and cultural development"135 that, at the same 
time, ensures "political arrangements that respect the ongoing capacity of individuals and groups 
to freely participate in the formation of laws affecting their future in the years."136 As Patrick 
Macklem argues, a static read of the self determination norm suggests that the only thing 
required is that people are able to freely choose their government, whereas a more dynamic read 
requires the policing of the form and substance of that government.137  
Prior to the election of the AK Party, the excising of political groups from the public 
sphere based on militant democratic discourse, underpinned by a more dynamic read of self  
determination, allowed for the banning of political parties based on the need to ensure that the 
democratic machinery was protected. Yet by 2015, Turkey’s political landscape was irrevocably 
altered. The "collectivity" has indeed spoken in Turkey, with the AK Party gaining yet another 
electoral success in the August 2014 Presidential elections and ultimately a majority in the 
general elections of 2015. This has, in turn, reshaped how Turkey’s political community is 
constituted with the question as to who should be appointed the gatekeeper of Turkish national 
identity, unresolved. What is certain is that a significant part of Turkish civil society has captured 
the public square and is unlikely to relinquish this space. The hegemonic control of Turkish 
identity as secular is contested; just what is to emerge in its place is unclear. What is clear, 
however, is that is that regime change has brought the margins of Turkish civil society to the 
core of power and with it, previously excluded post secular norms and values. It is at this 
intersection that this “paradox” of the self determination is so clearly revealed.  
Arriving back to the original question, one asks: whether the Trojan horse has indeed 
been released? Whilst the success of the AK Party is often attributed to the charismatic 
authority138 of Erdoğan, 139 critics suggest that there has been a roll back in democratic reforms 
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since 2010. They point to the swift and brutal response to the Gezi Park protests of summer 
2013, 140 the reaction to the public demonstrations on the one-year anniversary of Gezi and the 
protests in response to the Soma mining disaster, as well as the banning of Twitter and YouTube 
in 2014, and most recently, limitation and restrictions on freedom of expression,141 as markers of 
Erdoğan’s authoritarian departure.142 Additionally, significant amendments to the laws on the 
judiciary were made in February 2014 when the Grand National Assembly passed Law No. 6524 
that amends Law No. 6087 on the High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, Law No. 2802 
on Judges and Public Prosecutors, Law No. 2992 on the Organization and Duties of the Ministry 
of Justice, and Law No. 4954 on the Turkish Justice Academy.143 The amendments, despite the 
partial annulment of the law by the Constitutional Court in 2014, allow for more control of the 
government over the judiciary and call both the separation of powers and rule of law principles 
into question. For some commentators, this signals that,  
Rather than committing itself to overhauling the justice system to make it 
effective, independent and impartial, the government has chosen to increase 
political control over the judiciary. After a rotation of suspected Gülen supporters 
from the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, the ruling party swiftly 
proceeded to change the law to tie the body more closely to the executive. In a 
move that violates the principle of the separation of powers, designed to safeguard 
judicial independence, the justice minister was granted much greater power to 
intervene in the council and to initiate disciplinary investigations.144  
Yet despite Erdoğan’s more recent authoritarian leanings, changes to the socio legal 
landscape in Turkey more than thirteen years since the AK Party came to power suggest that the 
merits of the Refah decision, and the efficacy of its militant democratic roots, are far from clear. 
Enforced secularism coupled with the excise of political parties had, in the past, defined 
Turkey’s political landscape. Enforcement of Kemalist ideology was not confined to national 
courts but was endorsed (uncritically) by the ECtHR in the Refah decision, where it placed its 
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"faith" in militant democratic principles. Although such practices were justified based on 
arguments of security and national unity, they underpinned the marginalization of significant 
portions of Turkish civil society. Turkish identity was state crafted extinguishing diversity and 
excising faith to the private sphere. As well, prior to AK Party rule, successive Turkish 
administrations operated under the shadow of the military. Whereas the means by which the 
military has been removed from the political scene may be debated in Turkey, and particularly 
the conduct of the "Ergenekon" trials,146 it is undoubtedly true that the AK Party has succeeded 
in containing the threat of military interference in civilian government.147  
Finally, the AK Party’s approach in addressing the Kurdish question with political rather 
than military means was a significant departure from previous Turkish regimes. It did so despite 
having been accused of "betraying the republic and Turkish nation" by the Republican People's 
Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi, MHP)148 for its alliance with Öcalan and the PKK. The peace process was also important 
as it was seen as a vehicle for broader democratization in Turkey. Although the process itself has 
been stalled since July 2015, against this backdrop the Kurdish political movement consolidated 
its power in the two general elections held in 2015, surpassing the crucial 10% threshold in both. 
Kurds who were once on the periphery of political decision-making are now at its core and may 
well be the key in encouraging the AK Party toward further democratic reforms (to decentralize, 
recognize Kurdish and other ethnic identities, etc.). Had the AK Party suffered the same fate as 
Refah and its other predecessors on the basis that it may seek to "do away with democracy, after 
prospering under the democratic regime"149 it is very unlikely that these changes to the 
institutional structure and political landscape of the Turkish state would have occurred.  
Within the public domain, the question as to whether Erdoğan’s "authoritarian 
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departure," support or disrupt militant democratic arguments remains unresolved. What is clear, 
however, is that part of this contestation is the struggle for the hegemonic control of Turkish 
national identity. This battleground is not unique to Turkey but an examination of the Turkish 
case suggests that perhaps it is the question itself that needs to be recalibrated. At its heart the 
contestation over the use of militant democratic techniques is whether or not this struggle is a 
struggle that happens within a self determination paradigm or outside of it. People in Turkey 
have freely elected their government (static self determination) yet some within the country and 
indeed outside wish to ensure that its "form" is compatible with liberal principles (dynamic). The 
question that must be asked then is if these two parts of the self determination norm collide, 
should the tensions be resolved through militant democratic techniques or in a democratic 
maturing of a state?  
The changes that Turkey has experienced since the election of the AK Party both those 
that have prised open and those that have attempted to constrain the public space are perhaps 
better read as a society struggling to expand the notion of the social contract to include others not 
previously included. The form that this vehicle has taken was, at its core, the area of contestation 
in Refah and remains, at least in the public domain, the issue that makes AK Party governance 
vulnerable to the rhetoric of militant democracy.  
V. Conclusion 
While the Turkish case may well present a unique case of a “civil” Islamism, the security 
narratives that accompanied militant democratic action, and illiberal secular narratives, that 
challenged the pluralist agenda, all of which characterized and still does to a certain extent, the 
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Turkish socio legal landscape is not unique. Both militant democracy and legal pluralism lack 
legal frameworks yet, as our examination of the Turkish case suggests, the manifestations of 
each are already in practice.  
With regard to militant state action, the post 9/11 discourse has reinvigorated debate, 
globally, on the merits of militant democracy with advocates embracing Loewenstein’s thesis, 
and critics suggesting that these policies create the very conditions they aim to avoid. The 
question of legal pluralism poses an interesting juxtaposition between those who wish to create a 
framework that allows multiculturalism to find its public space, in this case in law, and those 
who believe it provides that toe in the door, which necessitates and justifies militant state action 
to protect democratic ideals. Thus, it could be  argued that the creation of autonomous legal 
spaces that challenge secular frameworks may engender other platforms through which 
inherently anti democratic practices thrive, leading back to the necessity for militant state action. 
What is alarming is that the discourse that accompanies each thesis often departs from a 
starting point that we feel is inherently flawed. In the public domain, the use of draconian 
measures is read as both necessary and effective. The concept of multiculturalism, including its 
manifestations, is now read and publicly proffered by political elites as having created the space 
for radicalized agendas to ferment. The public square in which these issues are debated has 
become increasingly censored. This examination, and the larger project which informs this work, 
endeavors to interrogate the normative frameworks that house both concepts. The Turkish 
context provides an interesting case study as to how the legal, social, and political space evolves 
when a previously marginalized political group comes to the center.  
While the results from this research are far from conclusive, what has emerged clearly is 
that notably absent from public discourse and mainstream academic study is the longer term 
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implications of public policies that embed militant democracy. Jan-Werner Müller reminds us 
that past experience suggests that "the treatment of public collective memory by political elites, 
and the formulation as well as the actual application of the legal means for dealing with the 
enemies of democracy, do have profound long-term effects on the framing of political 
cultures."151 Where “enemies” of democracy are imagined to be those who introduce religious 
arguments in to public reason, the exclusion of significant parts of civil society is likely to 
follow. Yet, as Andrew March asks, is it not, "precisely at these moments of founding and 
refounding within a polity, when obligations of justice are extended to previously excluded 
groups, that religious, philosophical, and extrarational modes of persuasion are most urgently 
needed?"152  
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